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1. Fostering a competitive internal market for the benefit of European companies 
and consumers alike 
The year 2018 marked the 60
th
 anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the 
European Economic Community, the foundation for today’s European Union. Today, the 
European Union, with its 24.5 million small, medium-sized and large companies competing to 
serve its 500 million consumers, continues to provide a vibrant internal market contributing to 
the competiveness of EU industry and sustainable development of the European economy 
based on competitive social market values.  
From the very beginning, the EU has had Treaty rules1 that gave the Commission the power to 
protect fair, undistorted competition in the internal market. EU competition rules lay down a 
well-defined legal framework for companies to do business in the internal market, enabling 
businesses of all sizes to compete fairly. This legal framework has evolved during the past six 
decades but adheres strictly to the principle of the rule of law under the close scrutiny by the 
European courts. The Commission rigorously applies the principles of non-discrimination, 
procedural fairness, transparency, predictability, the right to be heard and the protection of 
confidentiality in its daily enforcement practice. The predictability and credibility of the EU’s 
system has made the Commission one of the leading and most influential competition 
authorities in the world. 
In order to amplify the effects of its enforcement action, the Commission works hand in hand 
with the Member States' national competition authorities and national courts, and actively 
cooperates with competition agencies across the world – both at the bilateral level and at 
several international fora such as the OECD, the International Competition Network and 
UNCTAD - to develop a truly global level playing field and respect for the rule of law.  
On 7 June 2018, as part of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021-
2027, the Commission adopted the proposal for the Single Market Programme2. This includes 
the new Competition Programme, with an indicative budget of EUR 140 million over the 
programme period. When adopted by the co-legislators, the Competition Programme will help 
the Commission to tackle new challenges for EU competition policy linked to the use of big 
data, algorithms and further fast-moving developments in an increasingly digital environment, 
as well as strengthen cooperation networks between Member States' authorities and the 
Commission to support fair competition in the Single Market. 
                                                          
1
  Art. 3(1)(b) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The principal competition rules are enshrined in 
Chapter 1, Title VII of Part Three, Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and in the EU Merger Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 139/2004). 
2
 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Programme for 
Single Market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, and European 
statistics and repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014, (EU) No 
258/2014, (EU) No 652/2014 and (EU) 2017/826 COM/2018/441 final - 2018/0231 (COD): 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/single-market-programme-legal-texts-and-factsheets_en, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4049_en.htm. 
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In 2018, the Commission’s competition policy actions continued to target markets that matter 
for EU citizens and businesses in the EU, such as the telecommunications and digital sectors, 
financial services, energy and environment, agriculture and food, transport and 
manufacturing. This report is a non-exhaustive summary of activities undertaken by the 
Commission in the field of competition policy over the year 2018. Additional and more 
detailed information can be found in the accompanying Commission Staff Working 
Document and on the website of the Competition Directorate-General3. 
2. Enhancing the effectiveness of competition enforcement  
The Commission constantly aims at streamlining the procedures in competition cases and 
evaluating the economic effects of its past decisions, in order to enhance further the 
timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of its enforcement actions under the EU competition 
rules. 
In December 2018, the Commission published updated guidance for companies regarding 
business secrets and other confidential information4 during antitrust proceedings, as well as 
guidance and templates for the use of so-called confidentiality rings5
 
for access to file 
purposes. The access of companies to the information on the Commission's file is a 
fundamental procedural step in antitrust cases. These two new guidance documents are part of 
the Commission's continued work to increase the timeliness and efficiency of competition 
procedures, while guaranteeing due process and companies' rights of defense. They 
complement previous Commission guidance on best practices on data rooms6, guidance on 
confidentiality claims for the process of preparing public versions of its decisions7, as well as 
recommendations for the use of electronic document submissions8.  
Following the effective framework for rewarding cooperation by companies investigated in 
the area of cartels and a first non-cartel case in 20169, in 2018 the Commission concluded 
several non-cartel antitrust cases on the basis of cooperation by the companies under 
investigation10. Such cooperation allows the Commission to increase the relevance and impact 
of its decisions by speeding up its investigations, while companies can benefit from 
significant reductions of the fines depending on the nature and timing of their cooperation. In 
December 2018, the Commission published informal guidance on how companies can 
cooperate in antitrust probes in exchange for lower fines11. 
                                                          
3
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html.    
4
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/business_secrets_en.pdf.  
5
 A confidentiality ring is a negotiated disclosure procedure through which a restricted circle of individuals is 
given access to confidential information contained in the Commission's file. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/conf_rings.pdf.  
6
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/disclosure_information_data_rooms_en.pdf.  
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/guidance_on_preparation_of_public_versions_antitrust_04062015.pdf.  
8
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/contacts/electronic_documents_en.pdf.  
9
 Case AT.39759 ARA foreclosure, Commission decision of 20 September 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39759. 
10
 Commission decisions of 24 July 2018 in cases: AT.40181 Philips, AT.40182 Pioneer, AT.40465 Asus and 
AT.40469 Denon & Marantz; and Commission decision of 17 December 2018 in case AT.40428 Guess. For 
more information, see Chapter 3 of this Report. 
11
 The factsheet setting out the framework for such cooperation was published at the occasion of the adoption of 
the prohibition decision in case AT.40428 – Guess, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/data/factsheet_guess.pdf. 
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The European Parliament and the Council adopt the Commission's proposal to make the 
Member States' competition authorities more effective 
On 11 December 2018, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the so-called ECN+ 
Directive12 empowering Member States' competition authorities to be more effective enforcers 
of EU competition rules in the field of antitrust. The Directive was based on the Commission 
proposal of March 201713 following a public consultation between November 2015 and 
February 2016. 
The ECN+ Directive will ensure that when applying the same legal provisions – the EU 
antitrust rules – national competition authorities have the effective enforcement tools and the 
resources necessary to detect and sanction companies that break EU competition rules. It will 
also ensure that they can take their decisions in full independence, based on the facts and the 
law. The new rules contribute to the objective of a genuine single market, promoting the 
overall goal of competitive markets, jobs and growth. 
The ECN+ Directive shall be transposed by 4 February 2021. The Commission will monitor 
the transposition process and assist the Member States in transposing the Directive into 
national law within the two-year implementation period, starting from the publication of the 
Directive in the Official Journal.  
Reaping the benefits of the modernisation of State aid rules  
Since May 2012, the Commission has implemented a major reform package, the State Aid 
Modernisation. This consistent reform package allows Member States to implement State aid 
measures that foster investment, economic growth and job creation swiftly. As part of that 
package, new rules were introduced in 2014 – in particular the so-called General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER)14, which was further amended in 2017. These rules reduced 
the administrative burden for less distortive aid measures, which Member States no longer 
have to notify to the Commission. At the same time, measures that might seriously harm 
competition or fragment the Single Market continue to be subject to careful scrutiny. In the 
context of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, the Commission proposed to 
simplify co-investment involving both EU funding and Member State investment, through 
further expansion of the EU State aid Enabling Regulation, which is the legal basis for the 
adoption of the General Block Exemption Regulation.  
The 2018 State Aid Scoreboard15 confirmed the benefits of the State Aid Modernisation 
package. Since 2015, over 96% of new implemented aid measures fell under the GBER 
allowing more rapid implementation by Member States and the focus of State aid control 
being more "big on big things and small on small things". The growing share of spending 
falling under the GBER also implies that, on average, State aid measures registered by the 
                                                          
12
 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, OJ L 11, 14.01.2019, pp. 3–33. 
13
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities 
of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, 
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017SC0114. 
14
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/block.html. 
15
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.  
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Commission have been implemented by Member States much faster than in the past: 
compared to 2013, the average time to implement State aid measures decreased by 15%16.  
In the field of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), more than 90% of aid measures 
are also block-exempted under the SGEI Decision according to the annual SGEI reports 
submitted by Member States.  
The greater the transparency surrounding the use of State aid, the more likely it is that 
enforcement will be more effective. To that end, the Commission services facilitate 
compliance with the transparency provisions of the State Aid Modernisation Package – by 
developing, in cooperation with Member States, the Transparency Award Module17 – an 
informatics tool for submission and publication of data on State aid awards above EUR 500 
000. At the end of 2018, 25 Member States have joined the Transparency Award Module. 
More than 43 000 aid awards have been published by 25 Member States and Iceland. 
In 2018, the Commision launched, in line with Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines, 
the evaluation of State aid rules adopted as part of the State Aid Modernisation Package, as 
well as of the railways guidelines, and of the short term export credit insurance. The 
evaluation takes the form of a “fitness check”18 to verify whether the rules have actually 
worked in the way intended and are fit for purpose. It will provide a basis for decisions, to be 
taken by the Commission in the future, about whether to further prolong or update the rules. 
The fight against cartels continues 
The Commission recently set up an Anonymous Whistleblower Tool19, which makes it easier 
for individuals with insider knowledge of cartel conduct or other antitrust infringements to 
inform the Commission via a two-way encrypted messaging system about anti-competitive 
behaviour, while maintaining their anonymity. 
In 2018, the Commission's strong enforcement record against hard-core cartels continued to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the settlement procedure, which accounted for 75% of the 
decisions adopted throughout 2018. The settlement procedure helps bring secret cartels to 
light faster, freeing up valuable resources for other investigations. Under a settlement, 
undertakings that have participated in a cartel acknowledge their participation in the 
infringement and their liability for it. A settlement allows the Commission to apply a 
simplified procedure and reduce the duration and costs of the investigation, while companies 
benefit from swifter decisions and a 10% reduction in fines. 
                                                          
16
 For additional and more detailed information, see Part I of the Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying this Report. 
17
 See https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/chooseLanguage. 
18
 The current fitness check will cover: the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER); the ‘De minimis’ 
Regulation; the Regional aid Guidelines; the Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Framework; the 
Communication on State aid for important projects of common European interest (IPCEI Communication); the 
Risk finance, Airport and aviation Guidelines; the Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines (EEAG); the 
Rescue and restructuring Guidelines; the the Railways Guidelines; as well as the Short term export credit 
Communication (the two latter were not included in the 2012 State Aid Modernisation package). See 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-6623981_en. 
19
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/whistleblower/index.html.  
 5 
 
On 21 February 2018, the Commission imposed a total of EUR 546 million in fines for cartel 
participation in three different cases concerning the maritime transport of cars and the supply 
of car parts20.  
Commission decisions on maritime car carriers and automotive suppliers: the fight against 
hard-core cartels affecting European consumers and industries 
In three separate decisions, the Commission fined maritime car carriers EUR 395 million, suppliers of 
spark plugs EUR 76 million, and suppliers of braking systems EUR 75 million, for breaching the EU 
antitrust rules. All companies acknowledged their involvement in the cartels and agreed to settle the 
cases. All cases started with applications under the Leniency Notice. The successful immunity 
applicants involved in these cartels avoided fines because they revealed the existence of the cartels to 
the Commission.  
For almost six years, from October 2006 to September 2012, five carriers (Chilean maritime carrier 
CSAV, the Japanese carriers "K" Line, MOL and NYK, and the Norwegian/Swedish carrier WWL-
EUKOR) formed a cartel in the market for deep-sea transport of new cars, trucks and other large 
vehicles, on various routes between Europe and other continents. The carriers agreed to maintain the 
status quo in the market and to respect each other's traditional business on certain routes or with 
certain customers, by quoting artificially high prices or not quoting at all in tenders issued by vehicle 
manufacturers. The cartel affected car importers, vehicle manufacturers (as exporters) and final 
customers within the European Economic Area (EEA). During its investigation, the Commission 
cooperated with several competition authorities around the world, including in Australia, Canada, 
Japan and the US. MOL revealed the existence of the cartel, thus receiving full immunity and avoiding 
a fine of ca. EUR 203 million. 
Within the automotive sector, the Commission imposed sanctions in two further cartel cases. One 
concerned spark plugs (automotive electric devices), in respect of which suppliers Bosch (Germany) 
and NGK (Japan) had colluded with Denso (Japan). The cartel lasted from 2000 until 2011 and aimed 
at avoiding competition by respecting each other's traditional customers and maintaining the existing 
status quo in the spark plugs industry in the EEA. Denso received full immunity for revealing the 
existence of the cartel and avoided a fine of ca. EUR 1 million. The other Commission decision related 
to two infringements in the field of braking systems. The first cartel concerned the supply of hydraulic 
braking systems and involved TRW (USA; now ZF TRW, Germany), Bosch (Germany) and 
Continental (Germany), and lasted from February 2007 to March 2011. The second infringement 
lasted from September 2010 to July 2011, related to the supply of electronic braking systems and 
involved Bosch and Continental. In both infringements, the car part suppliers aimed at coordinating 
their market behaviour by exchanging sensitive information, including on pricing elements. By 
revealing the cartels and receiving full immunity, TRW avoided a fine of ca. EUR 54 million, and 
Continental of ca. EUR 22 million. 
The cartel decisions concerning spark plugs and braking systems are part of a series of major 
investigations into cartels in the automotive parts sector. The Commission had already fined suppliers 
of automotive bearings
21
, wire harnesses in cars
22
, flexible foam used (inter alia) in car seats
23
, parking 
                                                          
20
 Commission decisions of 21 February 2018: cases AT.40009 Maritime car carriers, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40009; AT.40113 Spark plugs, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40113; and AT.39920 
Braking systems, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39920.  
21
 Case AT.39922 Automotive bearings, Commission decision of 19 March 2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39922.  
22
 Case AT.39748 Automotive Wire Harnesses, Commission decision of 10 July 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39748.  
23
 Case AT.39801 Polyurethane Foam, Commission decision of 29 January 2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39801. 
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heaters in cars and trucks
24
, alternators and starters
25
, thermal systems
26
, lighting systems
27
, and 
occupant safety systems
28
. 
 
Furthermore, on 18 September 2018, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into 
the possible collusion of car manufacturers regarding technological development of emission 
cleaning systems for passenger cars. In October 2017, the Commission had carried out 
inspections at the premises of BMW, Daimler, Volkswagen and Audi in Germany as part of 
its initial inquiry in this case. The Commission is investigating whether these companies 
agreed not to compete against each other on the development and roll-out of emission control 
systems of cars sold in the EEA. The emission control systems concerned are Selective 
Catalytic Reduction (SCR)-systems, which reduce nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions of 
passenger cars with diesel engines, and Otto Particulate Filters (OPF), which reduce 
emissions of particulate matter of passenger cars with petrol engines. The formal opening of 
proceedings does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. 
On 21 March 2018, the Commission issued a decision29 in respect of a cartel in the capacitors 
sector. Capacitors are electrical components that store energy and are found in a wide variety 
of electronic devices used by consumers. Eight producers were fined a total of EUR 254 
million for engaging in cartel practices from 1998 to 2012. 
                                                          
24
 Case AT.40055 Parking Heaters, Commission decision of 17 June 2015, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40055.  
25
 Case AT.40028 Alternators and Starters, Commission decision of 27 January 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40028.  
26
 Case AT.39960 Thermal Systems, Commission decision of 8 march 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39960.  
27
 Case AT.40013 Lighting Systems, Commission decision of 21 June 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40013.  
28
 Case AT.39881 Occupant Safety Systems, Commission decision of 22 November 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39881.  
29
 Case AT.40136 Capacitors, Commission decision of 21 March 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40136. 
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The Commission sanctions early implementation in the merger area 
EU merger rules require that companies notify to the Commission their planned mergers of 
EU dimension for review ("the notification requirement") and do not implement them until 
cleared by the Commission ("the standstill obligation"). The standstill obligation prevents the 
potentially irreparable negative impact of transactions on the single market, pending the 
outcome of the Commission's investigation. 
On 24 April 2018, the Commissioned fined Altice30, headquartered in the Netherlands, EUR 
124.5 million for implementing its acquisition of the Portuguese telecommunications operator 
PT Portugal before notification or approval by the Commission (so-called gun jumping). The 
fine should deter other companies from breaking the rules. Implementing mergers before 
notification or clearance undermines the effectiveness of the EU merger control system, 
which protects European consumers from a merger that would lead to higher prices or 
reduced choice.  
3. Tackling new challenges in the digital economy  
Over the past six decades of European competition policy, markets have changed 
significantly. In particular, the digitalisation of the economy has profoundly transformed 
consumer behaviour and how markets operate.  
A particular challenge concerns data, against the background of the growing importance of 
algorithms. Algorithms need data to learn: the greater the quantity of data, the more intelligent 
the algorithms. Another point of interest is the increasing market power of digital platforms 
with a dual role, providing for a distribution channel for others while marketing their own 
products. To make the most of the potential and opportunities that digital technology brings, 
Europe needs a genuinely connected Digital Single Market. Competition policy is an integral 
part of creating a well-functioning Digital Single Market.  
The digital era has also brought entirely new market players to the fore, some of which have 
grown very rapidly and risen to become major technology providers. While the innovations of 
these successful companies, which dominate many recent and emerging digital markets, have 
made the lives of citizens and businesses easier, it remains essential that they are prevented 
from using their clout to undermine competition from others. To ensure that markets in 
Europe serve people and not the contrary, a regulation regarding data protection rules already 
exists31 and a regulation promoting transparency obligations from online platforms32 is being 
examined by the Council and the Parliament. 
In 2018, the Commission started a reflection process how competition policy can best serve 
European consumers in a fast-changing world. To this end, the Commission appointed, 
Professors Heike Schweitzer, Jacques Crémer and Assistant Professor Yves-Alexandre de 
                                                          
30
 Case M.7993 Altice / Portugal (Art. 14.2 proc.), Commission decision of 24 April 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7993.  
31
 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88.  
32
 See the Commission proposal for a Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of 
online intermediation services https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/regulation-promoting-fairness-
and-transparency-business-users-online-intermediation-services.  
 8 
 
Montjoye as Special Advisers on the future challenges of digitisation for competition policy.
33
 
The Special Advisers’ Report “Competition Policy for the Digital Era” was published on 4 
April 2019.
34
 In their report, the Special Advisers (i) identify what they see as the main 
specific features of digital markets; (ii) provide their views on the goals of EU competition 
law in the digital era; and (iii) discuss the application of competition rules to digital platforms 
and data, as well as the role of merger control in preserving competition and innovation. The 
report is designed to provide input to the Commission's ongoing reflection process about how 
competition policy can best serve European consumers in a fast-changing world.  
Antitrust enforcement defending innovation in the digital markets 
On 18 July 2018, the Commission took a decision35 finding that Google had abused its 
dominant position and fined the company EUR 4.34 billion for anticompetitive restrictions it 
had imposed, since 2011, on mobile device manufacturers and network operators to cement its 
dominant position in general internet search. 
The “Google Android” case: restoring the benefits of effective competition in the mobile sphere 
for European consumers 
Google's search engine is its flagship product, with yearly adverts revenues above 95 billion US 
dollars, mostly due to increased use of smart mobile devices. Today, mobile internet makes up more 
than half of global internet traffic. Moreover, around 80% of smart mobile devices in Europe and 
worldwide run on Android, which makes for more than 2.2 billion devices in total.  
The Commission’s decision covers three types of restrictions that Google imposed on mobile device 
manufacturers and network operators to ensure that traffic was directed to Google Search: 
- First, Google required manufacturers to pre-install the Google search and browser applications on 
devices running on the Android mobile operating system. Manufacturers had to comply if they 
wanted to be able to sell devices with the Google applications store. 
- Second, Google paid manufacturers and network operators to make sure that only the Google search 
application was pre-installed on such devices. 
- Third, Google obstructed the development of competing mobile operating systems. These could have 
provided a platform for rival search engines to gain traffic.  
                                                          
33
 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/commission-
appoints-professors-heike-schweitzer-jacques-cremer-and-assistant-professor-yves_en and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/scp19/.  
34
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf 
35
 Case AT.40099 Google Android, Commission decision of 18 July 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40099.  
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The Commission decision concluded that these three types of abuse form part of an overall strategy by 
Google to cement its dominance in general internet search, at a time when the importance of mobile 
internet was growing significantly.  
While market dominance is, as such, not illegal under EU antitrust rules, dominant companies 
have a special responsibility not to abuse their dominant market position by restricting 
competition, either in the market where they are dominant or in separate, but related, markets. 
Google's behaviour denied other companies the chance to compete and innovate on the merits 
and was therefore in breach of EU antitrust rules. Most importantly, it denied European 
consumers the benefits of effective competition in the important mobile sphere.  
The Commission decision required Google to bring its illegal conduct to an end in an 
effective manner within 90 days of the decision. At a minimum, the Commission's decision 
requires Google to stop and not re-engage in the three types of restrictions described above. 
The decision also requires Google to refrain from any measure that has the same or an 
equivalent object or effect as these practices. The Commission will monitor compliance with 
the decision very closely. The decision does not prevent Google from putting in place a 
reasonable, fair and objective system to ensure the correct functioning of Android devices 
using Google proprietary apps and services, without however affecting device manufacturers' 
freedom to produce devices based on Android forks. 
In 2018, the Commission continued to investigate restrictions that Google had placed on the 
ability of certain third party websites to display search advertisements from Google's 
competitors (AdSense). On 20 March 2019, the Commission fined Google EUR 1.49 billion 
for those restrictions.36 
On 24 January 2018, the Commission fined Qualcomm37 EUR 997 million for abusing its 
market dominance in LTE baseband chipsets, in breach of EU antitrust rules. The 
Commission’s decision requires Qualcomm to refrain from any practices that have the same 
or an equivalent object or effect in the future. The market for LTE baseband chipsets is 
                                                          
36
 Case AT.40411 Google Search (AdSense), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_ 
details.cfm?proc_code=1_40411. See also: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1770_en.htm.  
37
 Case AT.40220 Qualcomm (exclusivity payments), Commission decision of 24 January 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40220.  
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characterised by high barriers to entry and in which Qualcomm is by far the world's largest 
supplier. Between 2011 and 2016, Qualcomm made significant payments to Apple on 
condition that it would exclusively use Qualcomm chipsets in its iPhone and iPad devices. 
The exclusivity payments denied rivals the possibility to compete on merits and deprived 
European consumers of genuine choice and innovation. 
Effective cartel enforcement protects competitive input prices for digital devices 
On 21 March 2018, the Commission fined eight producers of capacitators (Elna, Hitachi 
Chemical, Holy Stone, Matsuo, NEC Tokin, Nichicon, Nippon Chemi-Con and Rubycon) 
EUR 254 million38 for participating in a 14-year long cartel for the supply of electrolytic 
capacitors. Capacitors are electrical components that store energy electrostatically in an 
electric field, and are used in a wide variety of electric and electronic products.  
The cartel meetings and contacts took place mainly in Japan but the cartel conduct was 
implemented on a global scale, including in the EEA The companies met regularly and 
exchanged commercially sensitive information on future prices and on future supply and 
demand needs. The objective was to coordinate future behaviour and avoid price competition. 
Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. and its parent Panasonic Corporation received full immunity for 
revealing the existence of the cartel to the Commission avoiding a fine. 
The Commission's investigation was part of a global effort. The competition authorities in 
Brazil, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan had already imposed fines on participants in the 
capacitors cartel prior to the decision by the Commission. In October 2018, Nippon Chemi-
Con was the eighth company to be fined in the United States. The South Korean competition 
Authority followed suit in December 2018 by fining nine companies. 
EU antitrust rules protecting price competition and better choice for consumers in the area of 
e-commerce  
E-commerce creates significant possibilities for consumers as well as for businesses. 
European consumers can have access to a wider choice of goods and services, as well as the 
opportunity to make purchases across borders, and are able to compare prices of sellers all 
over Europe. Similarly, businesses can trade throughout the Single Market of more than 500 
million people using a single website as their shop window. The rapidly growing online 
commerce market is now worth over EUR 500 billion in Europe every year, with more than 
half of Europeans shopping online.  
The Commission's e-commerce sector inquiry, the results of which the Commission published 
on 10 May 201739 as part of its Digital Single Market strategy, showed that resale-price 
related restrictions are by far the most widespread restrictions of competition in e-commerce 
markets. Effective competition enforcement in this area is therefore very important. The 
findings also shed light on the increased use of automatic software applied by retailers for 
price monitoring and price setting.  
                                                          
38
 Case AT.40136 Capacitors, Commission decision of 21 March 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40136.  
39
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf.  
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Tackling price intervention: the Commission fines four consumer electronics manufacturers for 
fixing online resale prices  
On 24 July 2018, the Commission took separate decisions
40
 fining Asus (Taiwan), Denon & Marantz, 
Pioneer (Japan) and Philips (the Netherlands) a total of 111 million euros, for restricting the ability of 
their online retailers to set their own retail prices for widely used consumer electronics products such 
as kitchen appliances, notebooks and hi-fi products. This type of conduct is called resale price 
maintenance. The four companies engaged in such conduct between 2011 and 2015. The price 
interventions limited effective price competition between retailers and led to an immediate effect on 
millions of European consumers, who faced higher prices for kitchen appliances, hair dryers, notebook 
computers, headphones and many other products available from online retailers. 
The four manufacturers intervened particularly with online retailers, who offered their products at low 
prices. If those retailers did not follow the prices requested by manufacturers, they would face 
sanctions such as blocking of supplies. Many companies use pricing algorithms automatically adapting 
their prices to those of competitors. Thus, the pricing restrictions imposed on low pricing online 
retailers ended up having a broader impact on overall online prices for those consumer electronics 
products. Moreover, the use of sophisticated monitoring tools allowed the manufacturers to effectively 
track resale price setting in the distribution network and to intervene swiftly in case of price decreases.  
All four companies cooperated with the Commission by providing relevant evidence and by expressly 
acknowledging the facts and the infringements of EU antitrust rules. Such cooperation resulted in 
speeding up the Commission’s investigation and increasing the impact and relevance of its decision. 
At the same time, companies benefitted from reductions to the fines depending on the extent of their 
cooperation, ranging from 40% (for Asus, Denon & Marantz and Philips) to 50% (for Pioneer). 
In its final report on the e-commerce sector inquiry, the Commission also found that more 
than one in ten surveyed retailers experienced cross-border sales restrictions in their 
distribution agreements. 
On 17 December 2018, the Commission fined the clothing company Guess close to EUR 40 
million for anticompetitive agreements to block cross-border sales. Guess' distribution 
agreements tried to prevent EU consumers from shopping in other Member States by blocking 
retailers from advertising and selling cross-border. This allowed the company to maintain 
artificially high retail prices, in particular in Central and Eastern European countries. Guess 
fully cooperated with the Commission by acknowledging the infringement and providing 
relevant evidence, and was able as a result to benefit from a 50% reduction of its fine.41  
The Guess decision follows up on the results of the sector inquiry. The Commission launched 
the investigation as a stand-alone procedure, independent of the sector inquiry. Moreover, the 
decision addresses the issue of sales restrictions that are at odds with the Single Market and 
complements the rules on unjustified geo-blocking, which are in force as of 3 December 
201842. 
                                                          
40
 Commission decisions of 24 July 2018: cases (vertical restraints) AT.40181 Philips, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40181; AT.40182 Pioneer, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40182; AT.40465 Asus available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40465; and AT.40469 Denon & 
Marantz, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40469.  
41
 Commission decision of 17 December 2018: antitrust case AT.40428 Guess, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40428 
42
 Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing 
unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or 
place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 
2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ L 60I , 2.3.2018, pp. 1–15. 
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EU State aid rules enabling European governments to support broadband deployment 
The Commission has defined its “digital agenda” targets and its targets for the “Gigabit 
Society”43 as one of its strategic priorities. Reaching the Digital Single Market connectivity 
objectives for 2020 and 2025 is estimated to require an overall investment of around EUR 500 
billion over the coming decade. While private funding is expected to cover a large share of 
such investment, public funding is required to ensure that rural and remote areas are not left 
behind. State aid control seeks to ensure that such public investments do not crowd out 
(planned) private investments and that publicly-financed infrastructure is open to all operators 
to compete. In this context, in 2018, the European Commission approved, under the 
Broadband Guidelines44, a Bavarian project45 to deploy very high capacity networks in six 
municipalities. This was the first time the Commission looked at a support measure as 
envisaged by the objectives of the Gigabit Communication. The transmission speeds are far 
above those that users have had so far in the target areas. The new networks will therefore 
bring about a significant improvement in line with the strategic objectives of the Gigabit 
Communication. 
EU State aid rules enabling Member States jointly to support important projects of common 
European interest  
In June 2014, the Commission adopted a Communication on Important Projects of Common 
European Interest (IPCEI)46, aiming to encourage Member States to support projects that 
make a clear contribution to economic growth, jobs and the competitiveness of Europe. The 
IPCEI framework complements other State aid rules such as the General Block Exemption 
Regulation47 and the Research, Development and Innovation Framework48, which allows 
supporting innovative projects whilst ensuring that potential competition distortions are 
limited. The rules thus enable ground-breaking research and innovation and sharing of the 
results widely, whilst ensuring that the support by taxpayer money truly serves European 
citizens. 
In December 2018, the Commission found that an integrated project jointly notified by 
France49, Germany50, Italy51 and the United Kingdom52 for research and innovation in 
                                                          
43
 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-connectivity-competitive-digital-
single-market-towards-european-gigabit-society. See also https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/broadband-europe.  
44
 Communication from the Commission — EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the 
rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ C 25, 26.1.2013, pp. 1–26. 
45
 Case SA.48418 Bavarian gigabit pilot project – Germany, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48418.  
46 
Communication from the Commission - Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market 
of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, 
pp. 4–12. 
47
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/block.html#gber.  
48
 Communication from the Commission - Framework for State aid for research and development and 
innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, pp. 1–29. 
49
 Case SA.46705 IPCEI on Microelectronics – France, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46705. 
50
 Case SA.46578 IPCEI on Microelectronics - Germany, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46578. 
51
 Case SA.46595 IPCEI on Microelectronics - Italy, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46595. 
52
 Case SA.46590 IPCEI on Microelectronics - UK, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46590. 
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microelectronics is in line with EU State aid rules and contributes to a common European 
interest. The Commission has identified microelectronics as one of six Key Enabling 
Technologies deemed to be crucial for future industrial development.53 
The four Member States will provide up to EUR 1.75 billion in funding for this project aimed 
at enabling research and developing innovative technologies and components (e.g. chips, 
advanced optical equipment, integrated circuits, and smart sensors) that can be integrated in a 
large set of downstream applications. These include consumer devices, e.g. home appliances 
and automated vehicles, and commercial and industrial devices, e.g. management systems for 
batteries used for electric mobility and energy storage. In particular, it is expected that the 
project will stimulate additional downstream research and innovations in particular in relation 
to the broad area of the Internet of Things and to connected or driverless cars. The project 
aims at additionally unlocking EUR 6 billion in private investment, and it is to be completed 
by 2024. 
4. Competition policy in support of the EU's energy and environment objectives   
The Commission continues to work towards a European Energy Union in which clean energy 
can flow freely and securely. Reliable energy supplies, at reasonable prices for businesses and 
consumers alike, causing minimal environmental impact, are essential to the European 
economy.  
State aid in support of greening the economy  
State aid rules play a key role in promoting green and energy-efficient means of electricity 
production and consumption. They also support the investments necessary to provide security 
of supply, whilst decarbonising the European energy system. To this extent, the State aid rules 
help the EU reach its ambitious energy and climate targets at lowest possible cost for 
taxpayers and without unduly distorting competition in the Single Market, as well as 
contributing to the achievement of the Paris Agreement pledge to cut emissions in the EU by 
at least 40% by 2030. 
In 2018, the enforcement of State aid rules in the renewable energy field remained very high. 
The Commission approved 21 schemes in support of renewables and energy-efficient power 
plants. As a result, almost all Member States have now received State aid clearance for their 
renewables and combined heat and power (CHP) support schemes. For example, in Flanders, 
high-efficiency CHP installations receive certificates in exchange for their energy savings and 
can then sell these certificates on the market in order to obtain additional revenues on top of 
the usual electricity market price54. 
The State aid clearances granted in 2018 in the renewable energy field were based on the  
2014 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy. These Guidelines have 
enabled an increasing number of Member States to foster sustainable energy through 
competitive and technologically neutral tenders and to integrate renewables in the electricity 
market. This has resulted in lower cost for consumers in the electricity system as a whole. As 
an example, the first technologically neutral tender in Denmark approved in 2018 delivered 
record low prices, with both solar and on-shore wind projects winning the support. 
                                                          
53
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6862_en.htm 
54
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-821_en.htm 
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Moreover, on 26 February 2018, the Commission approved55 EUR 70 million public support 
scheme for electric buses and charging infrastructure in Germany until the end of 2021. To 
qualify for the support, public transport operators must ensure that their electric and plug-in 
hybrid buses operate with electricity from renewable sources. On 14 November 2018, the 
Commission approved56 EUR 107 million public support for greener buses in Germany, by 
retrofitting diesel buses used for public passenger transport in approximately 90 
municipalities where the limits for nitrogen oxides emissions were exceeded in 2016 or 2017. 
Both measures are in line with the EU environmental goals, as well as with the European 
Strategy for low-emission mobility, and its support for the move towards zero-emission 
vehicles in cities and for creating a market for such vehicles. 
 Regulating the electricity market while delivering on the EU’s energy and climate objectives 
Capacity mechanisms aim at ensuring the security of electricity supply. Typically, capacity 
mechanisms offer additional rewards to capacity providers, on top of income obtained by 
selling electricity on the market, in return for maintaining existing capacity or investing in 
new capacity needed to guarantee security of electricity supplies. However, capacity 
mechanisms cannot substitute electricity market reforms at national and European levels. In 
parallel Member States must implement market reforms to address market or regulatory 
failures that undermine the incentive for energy operators to invest in energy capacity in 
accordance with the decarbonisation objectives of the Union. 
In its 2016 report of the Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms57, the Commission 
concluded that capacity mechanisms can affect the generation mix and in particular interact 
with instruments aimed at fostering decarbonisation. To promote non-fossil based capacity, 
the Commission recommended that eligibility or allocation criteria for capacity mechanisms 
allow renewables and demand-side operators to compete alongside other capacity. Otherwise, 
capacity mechanisms may risk jeopardising decarbonisation objectives while pushing up the 
price for security of supply. 
On 18 December 2018, a political agreement was reached on the Clean Energy for All 
Europeans Package58. The Package constitutes an important step towards the decarbonisation 
of the European energy system. Future capacity mechanisms will incorporate new caps 
regarding the carbon emissions of fossil fuel origin. Moreover, the Package introduces a new 
market design to create the right investment incentives and to enable further development of 
renewables in the electricity sector.  
State aid measures continue to ensure security of energy supply for European citizens and 
businesses 
On 7 February 2018
59
, the Commission approved six electricity capacity mechanisms to ensure 
security of supply in Belgium
60
, France
61
, Germany
62
, Greece
63
, Italy
64
 and Poland
65
. An additional 
                                                          
55
 Case SA.48190 Support scheme for the acquisition of electric buses for urban public transport, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48190.  
56
 Case SA.51450 Scheme for retrofitting diesel buses in local public transport, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_51450.  
57
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/capacity_mechanisms_final_report_en.pdf 
58
 See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans 
59
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-682_fr.htm 
60
 Case SA.48648 Belgian Strategic Reserve, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48648. 
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capacity mechanism was approved for Greece in on 30 July 2018.
66
 Basing its decisions  on the 2014 
Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy, the Commission found that the 
measures will contribute to ensuring security of supply without causing higher electricity prices for 
consumers or hindering electricity flows across EU borders and that they were thus in line with the EU 
State aid rules. 
The seven capacity mechanisms approved, concern more than half of the EU population. They cover a 
range of different types of mechanism that address the specific need in each Member State. The seven 
decisions support the Commission's Energy Union Strategy to deliver secure and competitive energy 
in Europe.  
By means of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), State aid rules also play a key role in 
delivering on climate objectives by lowering the indirect costs of the EU’s carbon market for 
the most electricity-intensive industries. The core principle of the ETS is that polluters should 
pay for their carbon emissions. However, outside of the EU, not all countries apply this 
principle. If enterprises were to delocalise some of their production outside the EU as a result 
of carbon costs, this would result in an increase of global carbon emissions. Because 
electricity generators do not receive free allowances, they have to buy them, thereby 
increasing the electricity price for consumers. To this end, Member States may partially 
compensate electricity-intensive consumers for the indirect costs resulting from the ETS.  
In 2012, the Commission adopted Guidelines setting the conditions under which Member 
States can grant such partial compensation regarded as constituting State aid for the trading 
period 2012-2020. On 14 March 2018, the Council and the Parliament adopted a revised ETS 
Directive for the period 2021-2030. It underlines that Member States should seek to limit their 
compensation to 25% of their ETS auction revenues. The Commission therefore launched on 
20 December 2018 the revision process of the ETS State aid Guidelines.  
Supporting open and integrated markets for gas and electricity 
To achieve its ambitions enshrined in the Paris Agreement67, the EU needs to increase the 
share of renewable energy in its energy mix, such as wind and solar, while ensuring 
availability of competitively priced gas as a flexible back-up capacity. Effective competition 
in European gas markets does not only depend on the enforcement of EU competition rules 
but also on investment in gas supply diversification, well-targeted European and national 
energy legislation and their proper implementation. All this builds into the European Energy 
Union, which is a key priority of the Commission. 
In 2018, the Commission continued to promote the development of an open and competitive 
energy market to the benefit of consumers, in line with Energy Union objectives. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
61
 Case SA.48490 Specific demand response tender in France, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48490.  
62
 Case SA.45852 German capacity reserve, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45852.  
63
 Case SA.48780 Prolongation of the Greek interruptibility scheme, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48780.  
64
 Case SA.42011 Italian capacity mechanism, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_42011.  
65
 Case SA.46100 Planned Polish capacity mechanism, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46100.  
66
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/state_aid_to_secure_electricity_supply_en.html 
67
 See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en.  
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On 24 May 2018, the Commission adopted a decision68 removing obstacles created by 
Gazprom, which affected free flow of gas in Central and Eastern Europe, and imposing on 
Gazprom a set of obligations for its future conduct. 
The Gazprom decision: enabling free flow of gas at competitive prices 
Gazprom is the dominant gas supplier in a number of Central and Eastern European countries. In April 
2015, the Commission set out its concerns that Gazprom breached EU antitrust rules by pursuing an 
overall strategy to partition gas markets along national borders in eight Member States: Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. This strategy enabled 
Gazprom to charge higher gas prices in five of these Member States (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland). 
 
To address the Commission's competition concerns, Gazprom must comply with a set of obligations 
aimed at ensuring the free flow of gas at competitive prices across Central and Eastern Europe. These 
obligations on Gazprom will be in place for eight years. They reflect feedback from stakeholders in a 
market test, which the Commission launched in March 2017. 
Specifically, there are four parts to Gazprom's obligations. First, Gazprom's customers are no longer 
restricted from re-selling purchased gas cross-border. Second, they have more flexibility on where 
they want Gazprom to deliver their gas (some parts of Central and Eastern Europe, namely the Baltic 
States and Bulgaria, are still isolated from other Member States due to the lack of interconnectors). 
Third, customers receive an effective tool to make sure their gas price reflects the price level in 
competitive Western European gas markets, especially at liquid gas hubs. Fourth, Gazprom cannot act 
on any advantages concerning gas infrastructure. 
Combined, these obligations address the Commission's competition concerns and achieve its 
objectives of enabling the free flow of gas in Central and Eastern Europe at competitive prices. The 
Commission decided to make these obligations (so-called "commitments") legally binding on 
Gazprom, which means that if the company breaks any of these obligations, the Commission can 
impose a fine of up to 10% of its worldwide turnover. 
                                                          
68
 Case AT. 39816 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, Commission decision of 24 May 
2018, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39816.  
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On 21 June 2018, the Commission opened a formal investigation69 to assess whether supply 
agreements between Qatar Petroleum companies exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
European importers have hindered the free flow of gas within the European Economic Area, 
in breach of EU antitrust rules. Qatar Petroleum is the largest exporter of LNG globally and to 
Europe, accounting for around 40% of the EU's overall LNG imports and significantly higher 
import shares in certain Member States. The Commission will further investigate whether 
Qatar Petroleum's long-term agreements (typically of 20 or 25 years' duration) for the supply 
of LNG into the EEA contain territorial restrictions, segmenting the EU's internal gas market. 
On 7 December 2018, the Commission adopted a decision rendering legally binding the 
commitments offered by German grid operator TenneT70 to increase significantly cross-border 
flows of electricity between Denmark and Germany. TenneT will ensure that a specific 
guaranteed capacity is available at all times, thus allowing more electricity producers to 
access the German wholesale market. This is fully in line with the Commission’s ambition to 
make the European energy market more competitive and integrated, and to facilitate the 
Union's transition to cleaner, renewable energy sources to the benefit of consumers. 
On 17 December 2018, the Commission fined71 Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH), its gas 
supply subsidiary Bulgargaz and its gas infrastructure subsidiary Bulgartransgaz (the BEH 
group) EUR 77 million for blocking competitors' access to key gas infrastructure in Bulgaria, 
in breach of EU antitrust rules. 
Furthermore, the Commission continues its investigation of the Romanian transmission 
system operator Transgaz72 for potential export restrictions of gas. 
5. Protecting competition in the Single Market  
Successful global companies are often the result of organic growth in competitive home 
markets due to their business expertise and innovativeness. However, in some cases 
companies may determine that mergers can help them gain the size and strength necessary to 
compete more efficiently both in Europe and abroad. They may expect the mergers to 
combine complementary portfolios, bring about scale efficiencies or facilitate entry into new 
markets or geographies. These benefits, in so far as they materialise, can also bring benefits to 
their customers. EU merger control allows companies to grow by acquiring other businesses, 
while at the same time preserving choice, quality, innovation and competitive prices for 
citizens and businesses in the EU. 
The key merger operations in the agro-chemical sector 
Seeds and pesticides are essential for farmers and ultimately consumers. The Commission 
ensures effective competition in this sector, so that farmers can have access to innovative 
products, better quality and competitive prices. In assessing recent mergers in this 
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 Case AT.40416 LNG supply to Europe, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40416.  
70
 Case AT.40461 DK/DE Interconnector, Commission Decision of 7 December 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40461.  
71
 Case AT.39849 BEH gas, Commission decision of 17 December 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39849. 
72
 Case AT.40335 Romanian gas interconnectors, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40335.  
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concentrated market, between Dow and DuPont73 and between Syngenta and ChemChina74, 
the Commission assessed their impact on all aspects of competition, including farmers’ costs 
and innovation. Both decisions followed an in-depth review of the proposed transactions.  
On 21 March 2018, the Commission gave conditional approval to Bayer's plans to buy 
Monsanto75 under the EU Merger Regulation, following an in-depth review. The merger was 
conditional on the divestiture of an extensive remedy package worth above EUR 6 billion, 
which addresses the parties' overlaps in seeds, pesticides and digital agriculture.  
The conditional approval of the merger between Bayer and Monsanto: maintaining competition 
and innovation in the agro-chemical market 
Bayer (Germany) and Monsanto (United States) are both major players in the seeds and pesticides 
industries. Monsanto is the world's largest supplier of seeds, which generates most of its sales in the 
US and Latin America (less than 10% of its products are sold in Europe). Bayer is the second largest 
supplier of pesticides worldwide, selling about 30% of its products in Europe. It is also an important 
globally active seeds supplier for a number of crops.  
As part of its in-depth investigation, the Commission assessed more than 2,000 different product 
markets and reviewed 2.7 million internal documents. In particular, the market investigation identified 
competition concerns in the areas of pesticides, seeds and traits, as well as digital agriculture.  
To address the identified competition concerns, the Commission decision of 21 March 2018 
specifically required Bayer to sell its EUR 6 billion worth of relevant businesses and assets, including 
research and development, to a suitable purchaser. The Commission concluded that the divestment 
package enables a suitable competitor to sustainably replace Bayer's competitive constraint in the 
relevant markets and continue to innovate, for the benefit of all Europeans, consumers and farmers 
alike, and the environment. 
On 30 April 2018, the Commission conditionally approved under the EU Merger Regulation the 
acquisition of parts of Bayer's Crop Science business by BASF
76
 – in relation to the Bayer/Monsanto 
merger divestment commitments.  
By making sure that the number of global players actively competing in these concentrated markets 
stays the same, the Commission decision on Bayer/Monsanto ensures that effective competition and 
innovation in seeds and traits, pesticides and digital agriculture markets continues, and that farmers 
have as wide a choice as before when it comes to suppliers of seeds and pesticides in these markets. 
The transaction created the largest global integrated seeds and pesticide company. 
Given the worldwide scope of Bayer and Monsanto's activities, the Commission cooperated 
closely with a number of competition authorities on this case, notably with the Department of 
Justice in the United States of America and the antitrust authorities of Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, India, China and South Africa. 
When it comes to seeds and pesticides there are additional vital concerns that go beyond 
competition policy, including consumer protection, food safety and ensuring the highest 
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 Case M.7932 Dow / DuPont, Commission decision of 27 March 2017, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7932. 
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Case M.7962 ChemChina / Syngenta, Commission decision of 5 April 2017, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
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 Case M.8084 Bayer / Monsanto, Commission decision of 21 March 2018, available at 
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76
 Case M.8851 BASF / Bayer Divestment Business, Commission decision of 30 April 2018, available at 
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standards for the environment and the climate. The existing national and European regulatory 
standards on these matters will remain just as strict after these mergers as before them and 
continue to apply. 
Preserving effective competition on European steel markets  
Steel is a critical input for many European industries and products, and the European steel 
sector employs around 360,000 people in more than 500 production sites across 23 Member 
States.  
On 7 May 2018, following an in-depth review, the Commission approved the acquisition of 
Ilva by ArcelorMittal77, the largest producer of flat carbon steel in Europe and worldwide. The 
Commission decision is conditional on the divestiture of an extensive remedy package to 
preserve effective competition on European steel markets, to the benefit of consumers and 
businesses. 
The Commission’s conditional approval of ArcelorMittal's acquisition of Ilva 
ArcelorMittal, headquartered in Luxembourg, controls a wide production network across the European 
Economic Area, while Ilva has major production assets in Italy, including its steel plant in Taranto, 
Europe's largest single-site integration flat carbon steel plant. ArcelorMittal's acquisition of Ilva 
creates by the far largest steelmaker in Europe. 
As part of its in-depth investigation, the Commission reviewed more than 800,000 internal documents 
and took into account feedback from over 200 customers active in a wide range of sectors, such as 
construction, car manufacturing, household appliances, and tubes. These customers rely on 
competitive steel prices to compete with imported products in the Single Market as well as on global 
markets. 
In order to address the Commission's competition concerns on hot rolled, cold rolled and galvanised 
flat carbon steel, ArcelorMittal proposed to sell a number of steel plants throughout Europe to one or 
more buyers competing with ArcelorMittal on a lasting basis. 
The Commission concluded that the proposed transaction, as modified by the commitments, ensures 
that competition is preserved on European steel markets and does not result in higher prices, in the 
interest of European manufacturing industries and consumers. The decision is conditional on full 
compliance with the commitments.  
Merger control thus goes hand in hand with decisive EU action to protect the EU's steel 
industry from unfair trade distortions from third countries. The Commission takes into 
account the concerns of European steel industry but also the many European businesses that 
rely on steel as an input. Currently, there are various trade defence measures in place on 
imports of steel and iron products, including from China, Russia, India and several others. 
Moreover, several trade defence investigations for steel products are currently ongoing. In 
addition, the Commission participates in the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity to tackle 
root causes of the global overcapacity in the steel sector to develop concrete policy solutions. 
The sale of Ilva's assets to ArcelorMittal should equally help accelerate the urgent 
environmental clean-up works in the Taranto Region. This essential de-pollution work should 
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continue without delay78 to protect the health of neighbouring population and environment, as 
agreed in 2016-2017 with the Italian authorities.  
In a separate investigation under State aid rules, the Commission had concluded on 21 
December 201779 that two loans granted by Italy in 2015 to support Ilva involved illegal and 
incompatible State aid. The Commission requested Italy to recover undue benefits of ca EUR 
84 million from Ilva.  
The Commission’s in-depth investigation into Siemens’ proposed acquisition of Alstom 
Trains and the signalling equipment that guide them are essential for transport in Europe. On 
13 July 2018, the European Commission opened an in-depth investigation80 to assess the 
proposed acquisition of Alstom by Siemens, under the EU Merger Regulation.  
Siemens (Germany) and Alstom (France) are global leaders in rail transportation, and the 
proposed transaction would combine the two largest suppliers of rolling stock and signalling 
solutions in the EEA, not only in terms of size of the combined operations, but also in terms 
of their geographic footprint. 
The Commission’s concerns related to the possibility of reduced competition in the markets 
where the merged entity would be active, particularly in the supply of several types of trains 
(rolling stock) and signalling systems to rail operators. This could lead to higher prices, less 
choice of suppliers and innovative products, to the detriment of train operators, infrastructure 
managers and ultimately the millions of Europeans who use rail transportation every day for 
work or leisure. The Commission considered that the entry of new competitors into the EEA 
rolling stock or signalling solutions markets, including in particular of potential Chinese 
suppliers, appeared unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 
The Commission carried out an in-depth investigation into the effects of the transaction to 
determine whether its competition concerns were confirmed. The Commission considered that 
the merger would have harmed competition in markets for railway signalling systems and 
very high-speed trains. The parties did not offer remedies sufficient to address these concerns. 
On 6 February 2019, the Commission prohibited Siemens' proposed acquisition of Alstom 
under the EU Merger Regulation81.  
Fostering a competitive transport market 
A competitive and efficient transport sector is essential for a well-functioning single market, a 
sustainable growth strategy and an open economy integrated into the global markets.  
The very considerable growth in air traffic continued in 2018, partly driven by the benefits of 
intense competition between airlines and airports. Preserving effective competition in this 
sector continued to be a priority. As regards airports, the Commission adopted a decision 
finding that the twenty-year extension of the concession for Athens International Airport 
Eleftherios Venizelos does not constitute State aid.82 This decision was adopted only after the 
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initial concession fee of EUR 484 million, which was based on financial and business 
parameters that were not in line with market conditions, was increased to EUR 1,115 million. 
In the light of this increased price, the Commission found that the extended concession 
involves no State aid because Athens International Airport S.A. will pay an adequate market 
fee to continue operating Athens International Airport Eleftherios Venizelos. 
In November 2018, the Commission opened proceedings under Article 101 TFEU against 
Amadeus83 and Sabre84, leading worldwide suppliers of computerised reservation systems. 
The investigation focuses on possible restrictions in competition in the market for airline 
ticket distribution services. The Commission is concerned that such restrictions could create 
barriers to innovation and raise ticket distribution costs, ultimately raising ticket prices for 
travellers.   
As regards the airline sector, the Commission's merger decisions in the context of the 
bankruptcy of Air Berlin allowed for a timely acquisition of Air Berlin’s assets by strong 
competitors which will not only preserve but improve competition at various airports in 
Germany and Austria to the benefit of many European passengers flying out and to these 
airports85. To counter undue distortions of competition through the granting of state aid to 
airlines in economic difficulties, the Commission also opened a formal investigation into a 
EUR 900 million bridge loan granted by the Italian State to Alitalia in the course of 201786.  
6. Making the financial sector more resilient in a Banking Union context 
The general stabilisation of the financial sector and the gradual implementation of the 
Banking Union regulatory framework has resulted in less interventions from the public 
budget, hence a reduction of new State aid cases in this sector. Moreover, the Commission 
could complete the monitoring of a further ten banks with respect to commitment obligations 
resulting from past State aid decisions, as well as close a number of long-standing legacy 
cases.  
In Germany, the Commission approved in 2018 the aid-free privatisation of HSH Nordbank 
following an open and competitive process leading to the bank’s sale at a positive price and 
entailing restructuring to restore the bank’s long-term viability.87 The Slovenian state sold 
65% of its stake in the NLB Group, in line with a set of revised commitments approved by the 
Commission in 2018.88 This sale was a crucial element of the Commission's viability 
assessment in the NLB State aid decision of 2013. The Commission continues to monitor 
Slovenia’s compliance with the remaining commitments.  
Despite the EU banking sector’s improving resilience, parts of the financial sector still face 
some legacy problems, which pre-date the Banking Union framework, notably the still high 
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level of non-performing loans in some Member States. The Commission’s financial-sector 
State aid control continues to play a central role in dealing with these issues. 
In 2018, the Commission approved liquidation aid for the sale of Cyprus' second largest bank, 
the Cyprus Cooperative Bank, and the winding down of the residual entity89. This allowed for 
the orderly market exit of the bank that had already received State support twice in the past 
and enabled the removal of almost 30% of Cypriot non-performing loans from the domestic 
banking system. Also in Cyprus, the Commission gave its approval to the ESTIA scheme to 
support private households and micro-companies that have encountered difficulties in 
repaying mortgage loans and risk losing their primary residence.90 
In Italy, the Italian State guarantee scheme to facilitate the securitisation of non-performing 
loans (GACS), initially approved in February 2016 and subsequently prolonged until early 
March 201991. Under the scheme, Italian banks will continue to be able to finance the disposal 
of selected non-performing loans using a State guarantee granted at market terms. The GACS 
scheme has made an important contribution to the removal of non-performing loans from the 
Italian banking system: the 17 different GACS-supported non-performing loan disposals 
between the scheme’s entry into force and mid-November 2018 accounted for ca. 60% of the 
total net reduction of bad loans in Italy during that period (approximately EUR 51 billion in 
gross non-performing loans). 
7. Ensuring a level playing field in the area of taxation  
Confidence in the EU Single Market depends on creating a level playing field for companies 
to compete on merit, also when it comes to taxation. For example, a Member State cannot 
give tax benefits to multinational groups which are not available to other companies (often 
local businesses), since that would severely distort competition. 
The Commission continues its fight against selective tax advantages 
On 20 June 2018, the Commission concluded that Luxembourg's tax treatment of Engie,92 a 
supplier of gas and electricity, was illegal with regard to EU State aid procedures and 
incompatible with EU State aid rules. As a result, Luxembourg was required to recover more 
than EUR 120 million from Engie. 
Putting a stop to selective tax advantages: The Engie decision  
Following an in-depth investigation launched in September 2016, the Commission concluded that two 
sets of tax rulings issued by Luxembourg have artificially lowered Engie's tax burden in Luxembourg 
for about a decade, without any valid justification. 
In 2008 and 2010, respectively, Engie implemented two complex intra-group financing structures for 
two Engie group companies in Luxembourg, Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury Management. 
These involved a triangular transaction between Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury Management, 
respectively, and two other Engie group companies in Luxembourg. 
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The Commission's investigation showed that tax rulings issued by Luxembourg endorsed an 
inconsistent treatment of the same transaction both as debt and as equity, which did not reflect 
economic reality as it artificially reduced the company's tax burden. As a result, Engie paid an 
effective corporate tax rate of 0.3% on certain profits in Luxembourg for about a decade.  
On this basis, the Commission concluded that the tax ruling granted a selective economic advantage to 
Engie. Specifically, the rulings enabled Engie to avoid paying any tax on 99% of the profits generated 
by Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury Management in Luxembourg. Luxembourg was required to 
recover from Engie more than EUR 120 million in unpaid tax. 
 
The Commission welcomed the legislative steps taken by Luxembourg’s Government to amend its tax 
code and bring relevant provisions into line with the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
project
93
. They also contain an amendment of its corporate income tax law to prevent the non-taxation 
of profits arising in the context of the conversion of loans into shares. The amendment however does 
not concern triangular transactions as those implemented by Engie. 
The EU's State aid rules prevent Member States from giving unfair tax benefits only to 
selected companies. Member States cannot discriminate between companies in the same legal 
and factual situation in light of the objective of the same national laws. Such discrimination 
distorts competition and is illegal under the State aid rules. Furthermore, the State aid rules 
require that illegal and incompatible State aid is recovered in order to remove the distortion of 
competition created by the aid. There are no fines under State aid rules and recovery does not 
penalise the company in question, it simply restores equal treatment with other companies. 
On 19 September 2018, the Commission found that the non-taxation of certain McDonald's 
profits in Luxembourg94 did not lead to illegal State aid. This treatment, which was in line 
with national tax laws and the Luxembourg-United States Double Taxation Treaty, did not 
provide a selective advantage in favour of McDonald's, but was the consequence of a 
mismatch between Luxembourg and US tax laws. Therefore, the Commission concluded that 
Luxembourg did not break EU State aid rules.  
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Among the above-mentioned changes to the tax code to bring tax law in line with the OECD's 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, Luxembourg strengthened the criteria under its tax 
code to define a permanent establishment. Under the new provisions, which entered into 
effect on 1 January 2019, Luxembourg can, under certain conditions, require companies that 
claim to have a taxable presence abroad to submit confirmation that they are indeed subject to 
taxation in the other country.  
Additionally, on 19 December 2018, the Commission concluded that Gibraltar95 gave illegal 
tax advantages to multinational companies through a corporate tax exemption regime for 
interest and royalties from 2011 to 2013, as well as through five individual tax rulings that 
provided selective tax benefits on certain income generated by Dutch limited partnerships. 
The beneficiaries must return unpaid taxes of around EUR 100 million to Gibraltar.  
During the Commission's investigation, Gibraltar amended its tax rules to enhance its tax 
ruling procedure, reinforce its transfer pricing rules, enhance taxpayers' obligations (e.g. filing 
of annual returns, providing meaningful information in applications for rulings) and improve 
transparency on how it implements its territorial system of taxation. The Commission 
welcomed these improved rules, which entered into effect in October 2018. 
The Commission continues its investigations concerning tax rulings issued by the Netherlands 
in favour of Inter IKEA96 and a tax scheme for multinationals in the United Kingdom97. 
The Commission’s investigations of individual tax rulings in Member States prove their 
effectiveness 
Tax rulings as such are not a problem under EU State aid rules, if they simply confirm that tax 
arrangements between companies within the same group comply with the relevant tax 
legislation. However, tax rulings that confer a selective tax advantage to specific companies 
can distort competition within the EU's Single Market, in breach of EU State aid rules. 
Member States have achieved significant progress in implementing the Commission decisions 
to recover unpaid taxes adopted in the previous year by the Commission, which de facto 
prevents companies from continuing to benefit from illegal advantages. In May 2018, 
Luxembourg completed the recovery of more than EUR 260 million from Amazon, plus an 
amount of EUR 21 million of recovery interest. In October 2018, Luxembourg also recovered 
more than EUR 120 million from Engie, plus EUR 1 million of recovery interest. In the same 
month, Ireland recovered the full illegal and incompatible aid from Apple, i.e. EUR 13.1 
billion, plus about EUR 1.2 billion of recovery interest. For all these cases, the money is in an 
escrow account, pending the outcome of the ongoing appeal of the Commission's decision 
before the EU courts. 
8. Joining forces in fostering a global competition culture  
As world markets continue to integrate and more and more companies rely on global value 
chains, competition authorities need to increase their collaboration and agree on common 
standards and procedures more than ever before. Enforcing competition rules effectively 
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depends to a growing extent on co-operation with other enforcers. When business practices of 
a company harm competition in different countries and continents, fair and level market 
conditions can only be restored if enforcement authorities play as a team. 
The Commission has been at the forefront of international cooperation in the competition 
field, both on the multilateral and bilateral levels. Back in 2001, the Commission was among 
the founding members of the International Competition Network (ICN), which now counts 
more than 130 members. The Commission is also active in all international fora devoted to 
competition, including the OECD, UNCTAD, the WTO, and the World Bank98. 
At bilateral level, the Commission aims to foster the international level playing field through 
including competition and State aid provisions in its Free Trade and Assocation agreements. 
In 2018, the Commission continued negotiations with Chile, Mexico, Mercosur, Azerbaijan, 
Tunisia,Indonesia, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and opened negotiations with Australia, 
New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. At the end of 2018, the European Union and 
Switzerland negotiators agreed on the text of an Institutional Framework Agreement, which 
also includes State aid rules. Moreover, the Commission engages in a wide range of 
cooperation activities with competition authorities in a number of third countries, on the basis 
of agreements or memoranda of understanding. In June 2018, the Commission signed an 
Administrative Arrangement with Mexico. 
In 2018, DG Competition's cooperation in competition policy and in cases, including the 
dialogue on State aid control, continued with China's State Administration for Market 
Regulation (SAMR) which was established in 2018 as a result of reorganization of the 
Chinese central administration. SAMR regroups the Anti-Monopoly Bureaus of Ministry of 
Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and State Industry for 
Industry and Commerce as well as the Fair Competition Review Bureau of the NDRC. The 
Directorate-General for Competition had case cooperation with SAMR in five merger review 
cases and responded to SAMR’s solicitation for comments on its draft regulations prohibiting 
abuse of dominant market position. Moreover, it had several exchanges at technical level 
regarding SAMR’s activities to promote its Fair Competition Review System. 
The Commission remains committed to fostering a far-reaching competition culture, as well 
as to promoting a global level playing field where companies can compete on their merits. In 
2018, the Commission continued its endeavours to improve multilateral rules regarding 
subsidies, as part of the EU concept for WTO modernisation. The main objectives are to 
increase transparency, to have better rules on harmful subsidies and to adequately address 
issues with State-owned enterprises. Moreover, the Commission continued to engage in 
sectoral initiatives to address subsidies in the international context, such as for steel (G20 
Global Forum on steel excess capacity), for semiconductors (Regional support guidelines for 
the semiconductor industry), and for shipbuilding (OECD). Finally, the Commission 
continues to work with EU Member States in the International subsidy policy group to 
exchange views and coordinate initiatives on international policy subsidies at multilateral and 
bilateral level. 
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Upholding a regular and constructive inter-institutional dialogue  
The European Parliament, the Council and the consultative committees, with their specific 
roles vis-à-vis European citizens and stakeholders, are key partners in the dialogue on 
competition policy. 
In April, Commissioner Vestager exchanged views with Parliament’s plenary session on on-
going general achievements in competition policy. In October, she discussed the benefits of 
competition to boost the competitiveness of European industries. In November, she welcomed 
together with Parliament the finalisation of the new Directive to make national competition 
agencies more effective enforcers of the European competition rules. The Commissioner also 
had topical debates with Committees in Parliament: the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee in June and October, and the Industry and Research Committee in July. For his 
part, Director-General Johannes Laitenberger visited the dedicated Competition Working 
Group of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in May. In November, he 
exchanged views with the full Economic and Affairs Committee, following Deputy Director 
General Carles Esteva Mosso's preparatory debate in this Committee in October. 
As in previous years, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the Commission's annual Report 
on competition policy. The Parliament endorsed a robust competition policy that preserves the 
integrity of the internal market and empowers citizens with affordable prices, choice and 
innovations in the market place. This was welcomed support for the Commission's efforts in 
2018 to tackle illegal cartels and abuses of a dominant position of companies, and to review 
mergers and State aid given in our Single Market. 
Also in 2018, Parliament remained engaged in the fight against tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Parliament welcomed that State aid control has proven effective in tackling selective tax 
advantages for multinationals. In 2018, the Commission continued to take important actions 
in this area99. The Commission took a systematic approach to analysing the evidence on tax 
rulings from all Member States. 
Parliament urged the Commission to continue playing its key role in controlling State aid in 
the financial sector, ensuring that aid to banks be kept to the minimum necessary and that 
adequate measures be taken to return the banks to viability and to minimise distortions of 
competition in the internal market. The Commission shared Parliament's goal of reducing 
State aid in the sector over time. The Commission continued to explain its actions in this field 
in the other institutions.  
In April, Parliament organised a hearing on the digital economy. Parliament called upon the 
Commission to reflect on the way that competition enforcement can remain up-to-date in an 
online society. In March, Commissioner Vestager appointed three special advisers to seek 
their input on key upcoming digital changes that will affect markets and consumers, and on 
their implications for competition. As part of the same exercise, the Commission initiated a 
consultation process on the importance of data, algorithms and other aspects of the digital 
economy and asked interested parties to submit their views. Parliament's ECON Committee 
welcomed these initiatives. 
In July, the Commissioner exchanged views with Members of the Parliament on the way that 
competition enforcement helps to boost the competitiveness of European industries. She 
explained that for every company that wants to merge, many companies in Europe rely on 
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input products at fair prices so that they can themselves grow in global markets. In this spirit, 
the Commission continues to investigate large industrial mergers for their impact on 
competition and thanked Parliament for its strong encouragement to do so. 
As national competition authorities take 85% of decisions applying EU antitrust rules, it 
proved imperative to boost their effectiveness as enforcers. In December 2018, Parliament 
and Council signed a Directive requiring Member States to give national competition agencies 
effective investigative powers and enforcement tools to protect competition on their 
territories, as well as the possibility to impose deterrent fines for anticompetitive behaviour 
and coordinate their leniency programmes. The Commission assured the Parliament that it 
would carefully check that Member States implement the Directive completely and 
effectively. In response to a call from Parliament, the Commission also stated that interim 
measures could be a key tool for competition authorities to ensure that competition is not 
harmed while an investigation is ongoing. With a view to enabling competition authorities to 
deal more effectively with developments in fast-moving markets, the Commission committed 
to undertake an analysis of whether there are means to simplify the adoption of interim 
measures within the European Competition Network within two years from the date of 
transposition of the new Directive. The Commission agreed to present the results to 
Parliament and Council. 
The Commission recognised the importance that Parliament and Council attach to effective 
competition throughout the food chain. In this spirit, in its recent decisions, such as the 
Bayer/Monsanto merger in the agro-chemical sector, the merger between US-based chemical 
companies Dow and DuPont, and ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta, the Commission 
applied an approach requiring substanial divestments of assets as a condition for clearing the 
transactions.The Commission continued to investigate AB InBev concerning its possible 
restrictions of parallel imports of its beers into Belgium. The Commission also published the 
Study on Producer Organisations and their activities in the olive oil, beef and veal and arable 
crops sectors, which was commissioned in order to understand better the challenges of 
farmers to set up producer organisations that can help them improve their position in the 
supply chain.   
In 2018, Commissioner Vestager and DG Competition also contributed, from the perspective 
of competition policy, to the debate on the Union's next multi-annual financial framework. 
The Commissioner attended the Competitiveness Council in March to explain how State aid 
rules can accommodate the growth of start-ups and midcaps, in view of the on-going 
discussions on the next multi-annual financial framework. At the end of 2018, Parliament and 
Council endorsed the proposed amendment to the Council Enabling Regulation 2015/1588 to 
exempt further categories of State aid from the obligation to notify aid to the Commission.  
The institutions also discussed the need to boost competition enforcement further under the 
next Union's multi-annual financial framework. In December, Parliament's Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee endorsed the competition aspects of the Single Market 
Programme. The Committee agreed that the Commission should have stable finances to invest 
in IT equipment to deal effectively with competition cases, to support cooperation networks 
with national and international competition agencies and to boost communication efforts to 
secure compliance with European competition rules throughout the EU. 
Representatives of DG Competition also exchanged views with the Economic and Social 
Committee. The Committee endorsed the main strands of the Commission's work in 
competition enforcement. The Committee also gave full support to the Council Enabling 
Regulation in the field of State aid. 
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The United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU 
Following the Article 50 TEU notification by the United Kingdom, the Commission started 
preparing the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Directorate-
General for Competition takes part in the preparation of this withdrawal, for what concerns 
the instruments in its portfolio (mergers, antitrust and State aid). Among other things, the 
Directorate-General for Competition supported the Commission's Task Force for the 
Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU 
in the negotiations on the withdrawal agreement. 
